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DALTON POWELL†  
ABSTRACT 
At its core, agency law governs fiduciary relationships 
between two distinct parties (the principal and agent) in 
interactions with third parties. The three separate relationships 
within agency (principal-agent, agent-third party, and principal-
third party) create binding legal rights and obligations. To be a 
principal or agent, one must be a person. The Restatement 
(Third) of Agency’s definition of person attempts to distinguish 
legally recognized persons from purely organizational entities 
and mere instrumentalities. The emergence of AI computing, and 
the ongoing development of truly autonomous computer systems, 
will test traditional agency law with questions like who or what 
can be a person. At present, the Restatement views computer 
programs as mere instrumentalities of the using person and thus 
not a separate person capable of being a principal or agent. This 
Note will analyze the tension created within agency law’s 
definition of personhood by the existence of autonomous systems. 
These autonomous systems can be persons in two ways: either as 
a direct person that is independent or as an indirect person that 
is formed by an algorithmic entity. This definitional outcome of 
personhood for autonomous systems determines whether 
autonomous computer programs can be principals or agents—a 
proposition that has monumental downstream implications 
beyond the scope of this Note but ripe for future research. 
Ultimately, this Note advocates for the acceptance of 
autonomous systems as legally recognized persons for the 
purposes of agency law. This recognition of personhood for 
autonomous systems should be direct and based on the 
acceptance that personhood depends on the moral recognition of 
autonomy; but, at the very least, recognition of personhood 
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should be indirect and based on the traditional recognition of 
organizations as legal persons. Pragmatic benefits of 
recognizing the personhood of autonomous systems support both 
the direct and indirect acceptance of such personhood.
INTRODUCTION 
Agency law encompasses three-party legal relationships where 
one person—the principal—manifests assent that another person—the 
agent—has the power to affect the principal’s legal relations with third 
parties through the agent’s acts.1 Each of these relationships requires that 
both parties to the relationship be a person.2 In agency law, the term 
agency is precisely used to describe the “fiduciary relationship that arises 
when one person . . . manifests assent to another person . . . that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, 
and the agent manifests assent . . . to act.”3 This definition differs from 
the colloquial, non-legal meaning of the word agency, with one such 
definition being “a person or thing through which power is exerted or an 
end is achieved.”4 Importantly, the legal definition of agency 
significantly differs from the economic definition of agency as “a 
contract under which one or more persons . . . engage another person . . . 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent.”5 Unlike the economic definition 
of agency, the legal definition does not require a contract or the 
delegation of decision-making, so legal agency can be broader than 
economic agency.6 Notably, the legal, economic, and one colloquial 
definitions of agency require the existence of at least two separate 
persons. 
                                                
 
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
2 Id. (“As defined by the common law, the concept of agency posits a consensual 
relationship in which one person . . . acts as a representative of or otherwise acts 
on behalf of another person . . . .”). 
3 Id. at § 1.01. 
4 Agency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https:// www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/agency (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
5 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 
(1976). 
6 Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01. Note that the two 
definitions are incongruous, so economic agency relationships can also exist 
where legal agency relationships do not. 
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Because personhood is a necessary element of legal agency, the 
definition of personhood is critical to the analysis of any possible agency 
relationship. Generally, personhood is an easily satisfied element.7 The 
emergence of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and the possibility of 
autonomous systems being agents or principals, serving in such capacity 
independent from human involvement, complicates the personhood 
definition. Commenters have theoretically explored this definitional 
question for over a quarter of a century.8 These previously theoretical 
complications of the personhood definition have become practical 
questions in the current technological environment, especially with the 
near possibility of fully autonomous cars.9  
Section II of this Note sets out the relevant doctrine of the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency regarding personhood. Section III 
discusses the current technological environment of autonomous systems 
and highlights the development of algorithmic entities—a possible 
organizational structure response to the traditional non-recognition of 
computer programs as persons. Section IV outlines why autonomous 
programs should be recognized, either directly or at least indirectly, as 
persons in agency. Section V concludes by flagging downstream 
implications and issues for future research if the autonomous systems are 
recognized as persons in agency law.  
                                                
 
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 cmt. c (using examples like the 
employee-employer to describe the “wide and diverse range of relationships” 
encompassed by agency). 
8 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 
N.C.L.R. 1231 (1992) (stating that the question of AI as a legal person “is only 
theoretical” but still addressing the question in a 50-page law review article). 
9 See Alex Davies, The Wired Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (December 
13, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/ (“In the past 
five years, [partially] autonomous driving has gone from ‘maybe possible’ to 
‘definitely possible’ to ‘inevitable’ to ‘how did anyone ever think that wasn’t 
inevitable?’ to ‘now commercially available.’”). For an example of how AI and 
self-operating machines creates similar stresses on possible tort liability, see also 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, 
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html 
(describing an incident where a test drive of an semi-autonomous car, which was 
still under the supervision of a human in the driver’s seat, struck and killed a 
pedestrian in Arizona and how the incident highlights necessitates a regulatory 
response to liability for similar incidents). 
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I must note the specific use of certain terms here. “Autonomous 
system” refers to non-human computer systems that, once created, can 
operate in undefined environments and react to unanticipated stimuli,10 
and my analysis will primarily focus on whether these autonomous 
systems should be persons under the Restatement (Third) of Agency. I 
purposefully avoid the use of the term “computer program” to reflect the 
technical usage of “autonomous systems.” These two terms are not 
interchangeable or analogous. While autonomous systems typically 
incorporate computer programs, not every computer program rises to the 
level of an autonomous system. 
I. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: DEFINITION OF 
PERSONHOOD 
Fortunately, the Restatement (Third) of Agency has provided a 
definition of person11 and extensive commentary to support this 
definition.12 For the purposes of agency, a person is (1) an individual, (2) 
an organization that “has legal capacity to possess rights and incur 
obligations,” (3) a governmental entity, or (4) any other entity that “has 
legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”13 The guiding 
principle underlying each of these categories of person is the “capacity to 
be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”14  
Capacity to be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal 
duties is clarified by references to the Restatement (Third) of Agency 
sections outlining the capacity to serve as a principal or agent.15 In 
defining legally recognized persons’ capacity as principals, the 
Restatement differentiates between individuals and non-individuals.16 
The “law applicable” to non-individuals governs the capacity of non-
individuals.17  The legal capacity of persons who are entities, like 
corporations, is governed by “the legal regime by virtue of which such 
                                                
 
10 For a discussion on the technical use of the term “autonomous system,” see 
infra notes 35–38 and the accompanying text. 
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04. 
12 Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e. 
13 Id. at § 1.04. 
14 Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e. 
15 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 3.04–3.05). 
16 Id. at § 3.04 (addressing individuals in paragraph (1) and non-individuals in 
paragraph (2)). 
17 Id. at § 3.04(2). 
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person exists . . . and functions.”18 For example, a Delaware 
corporation’s capacity as principal would be determined by the Delaware 
corporate law that enabled the corporation’s creation. The Restatement 
also differentiates between individuals and non-individuals in 
determining whether actors have capacity as an agent.19 Non-individuals’ 
ability to act as an agent depends on “the law through which the agent 
has legal personality.”20 Like the prior example in the context of a 
principal, a Delaware corporation’s capacity as an agent would be 
determined by the Delaware corporate law. 
This quality of capacity to hold rights and be subject to duties 
distinguishes legally recognized persons—whether individuals or non-
individuals—from purely organizational entities and mere legally 
consequential instrumentalities.21  Because characterization as purely 
organizational entities or mere legally consequential instrumentalities 
precludes personhood, such a characterization also precludes the ability 
to act as an agent or principal. Purely organizational entities are entities, 
like trusts or estates, that cannot be “directly the object of liabilities and 
the holder of rights.”22 Animals or inanimate objects are prototypical 
examples of merely consequential instrumentalities that a person uses to 
alter his, her, or its own legal rights and obligations.23  
Characterization as a merely consequential instrumentality is the 
more significant possible limitation on personhood than characterization 
as a purely organizational entity.24 The reporter’s note cites a case in 
which dogs are characterized as instrumentalities when used as a 
dangerous weapon for purposes of an armed-robbery statute.25 Another 
case describes dogs as non-persons who are thus unable to be subject to 
suit.26 The cases summarized in the notes generally deny sentient animals 
the possibility of personhood even while recognizing that animals are 
                                                
 
18 Id. at § 3.04 cmt. d. 
19 Id. at § 3.05 cmt. b. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at §1.04 reporter’s n. e. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e. 
24 See id. at § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (devoting one sentence to explain the relevance 
of purely organizational entities and three full paragraphs to specific analysis of 
mere legally consequential instrumentalities). 
25 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1975)). 
26 Id. (citing Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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complex beings with independent purposes, desires, and aversions.27 The 
Restatement’s approach sets some threshold level of autonomy that 
separates persons from “inanimate objects or a nonhuman animal.”28 
The Restatement also clearly states that “a computer program is 
not capable of acting as a principal or an agent.”29 The Restatement 
supports the general statement that computers are incapable of being an 
agent with a quote that computer programs are not juridical persons.30 
The Restatement and the cited article both reference electronic agents, 
computer programs without independent volition and designed as tools 
for their users, as a key example of why computers cannot be agents.31 
The Restatement classifies computer programs as “instrumentalities of 
the persons who use them.”32 Despite the clear initial statement of the 
incapability of personhood and classification of computer programs as 
instrumentalities, subsequent discussion of computer programs cracks the 
door for the future personhood of computer programs by qualifying the 




                                                
 
27 Id. (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS I at 98–99 (1985)) (“[W]hile Descartes ‘saw animals as 
complex machines,’ they are in fact subjects to whom we can attribute 
‘purposes, desires, aversions . . . in a strong, original sense . . . [t]hat the cat is 
stalking the bird is not a derivative, or observer-relative fact about it.’”). 
28 See id. at § 1.04 cmt. e (clearly distinguishing persons from inanimate objects 
or nonhuman animals). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at §1.04 reporter’s n. e (citing Joseph Sommer, Against Cyber-Law, 15 
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1177–78 (2000)). 
31 See id. (describing an electronic agent only as “the tool of the person who uses 
it” without independent volition); Joseph Sommer, Against Cyber-Law, 15 
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1177–78 (2000) (stating that a programmed machine is 
“not a juridical person and therefore cannot be an agent” because it owes no 
duties, lacks volition due to only following its internal programming, lacks 
capacity for suit, and has no interests of its own). 
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e. 
33 Id. 
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II. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
Before exploring the possible personhood of autonomous 
systems at present, a brief survey of the state of computing is necessary. 
The autonomy displayed by autonomous systems supports the moral 
justification for the recognition of direct personhood. Additionally, 
indirect personhood might also be recognized by creatively structuring 
organizational entities. These entity structures are called algorithmic 
entities. Conceptually, algorithmic entities are shells of personhood 
through which the autonomous systems direct the shell persons’ actions. 
Professor Shawn Bayern recently proposed such a shell using LLCs and 
the governing LLC law to wrap autonomous systems in personhood.34 
A. The Current State of Autonomous System Technology 
One recognized foreign research institute focusing on artificial 
intelligence research35 defines autonomous systems as “autonomous 
artifacts [like self-driving cars or smart robots] or large-scale self-
managing systems consisting of physical infrastructure and software that, 
together with humans, provide increased functionality, sustainability, and 
efficiency for society.”36 Autonomous systems “must be capable of 
planning and executing complex functions as intended, with limited 
                                                
 
34 See generally Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity 
Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 
(2015). 
35 The Wallenberg Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Systems and Software 
Program. This program is “a major national initiative [in Sweden] for 
strategically motivated basic research, education, and faculty recruitment in 
autonomous systems and software development.” WASP, About, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190331204903/https://wasp-
sweden.org/research/overview-of-autonomous-systems-area/ (last visited Apr. 
20, 2019). 
36 WASP, Overview of the Autonomous Systems and Software Area, 
https://wasp-sweden.org/research/overview-of-autonomous-systems-area/ (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2019); see also NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Program 
Solicitation for National Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research Institutes: 
Accelerating Research, Transforming Society, and Growing the American 
Workforce, https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2020/nsf20503/nsf20503.htm#summary 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (defining the broader concept of artificial intelligence 
as enabling computers to “perform tasks that have historically required human 
cognition and human decision-making abilities” and exercising “thought and 
intelligent behavior”). 
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human intervention, operating in uncertain and unstructured physical 
and/or information environments, and managing unexpected external or 
internal events.”37 This reactivity to unanticipated stimuli “distinguishes 
[autonomous systems] from mere automated systems, which also are able 
to execute complex functions, but which mostly assume structured 
environments [and] have limited capacity to learn and adapt to 
unexpected events.”38 
The technical definition used by autonomous system and 
software development researchers suggests that computing has moved 
past the law. This technical definition contemplates complex systems, 
not just the simple computer programs that caused the Restatement’s 
initial skepticism of computer programs as agents.39 The Restatement’s 
consideration of computer programs, and resulting skepticism, appears to 
be based solely on automated systems.40  
Examples of autonomous systems are readily available in society 
today.41  The most prevalent examples of autonomous systems are 
“tangible instantiations” like robotics and automatic driving that are 
meant to “replace or complement the human’s capacity to manage 
complexity.”42 Specific examples include Uber-CMU partnerships in 
autonomous driving; Nissan-NASA Ames partnerships in autonomous 
taxis; Volvo’s and Scania’s developments in self-driving trucking; the 
Google-Nest partnership possibly leading to autonomous HVAC 
systems; and Apple’s own developments in smart home control.43 Self-
managing data centers are information system instantiations of 
autonomous systems.44 These self-managing data centers “use control, 
                                                
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (emphasis added). 
39 Compare id. with Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04, comment e. (citing 
Sommer, supra note 31). 
40 See Sommer, supra note 31 (“[A programmed machine] simply responds to its 
internal programming and external parameters.”). 
41 WASP, supra note 38 (“There are now numerous industrial examples showing 
the tremendous potential and positive impact of technologies arising from the 
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machine learning, and data analytics techniques to master architectural 
and operation complexity.”45 
Autonomous system technology advancement is also relevant in 
the public sphere due to publicly funded technological development, 
regulation of new technologies, and the importance of new technologies 
to national security. Government research is currently creating 
autonomous systems.  For example, NASA is researching a “wide range 
of areas, such as artificial intelligence, advanced flight control laws, new 
testing methods, collision avoidance technologies, and much more” that 
use autonomous systems to produce “lifesaving collision avoidance 
technologies” applicable to the operation of aviation and non-aviation 
vehicles.46 Regulation is already adjusting to autonomous systems. The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a statement 
regarding automated vehicles in which the agency provided 
recommended principles for state regulation of driverless vehicle 
operation and outlined the agency’s own regulatory research programs.47 
In its definition of vehicle automation, the agency recognized and 
segmented the broad range of vehicle autonomy by the vehicle’s ability 
to act independently from humans.48 Finally, AI development is, and will 
continue to be, a key national government policy as the United States 
seeks to remain globally competitive with other countries that develop 
“more comprehensive plans to support homegrown AI industries.”49 
The clear delineation between autonomous systems and 
automated systems50 and readily observable technological advances in 
                                                
 
45 Id. 
46 Lee Obringer, Autonomous Systems, NASA (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/autonomous-systems (listing ten different 
technology projects upon which NASA is working). 





49 See BLOOMBERG, Opinion, Trump’s AI Plan is a Good Start (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-15/artificial-intelligence-
trump-s-smart-american-ai-initiative. 
50 See supra notes 35–40 and the accompanying text. 
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autonomous systems51 indicate that it is time for the law to recognize and 
respond to the important difference between autonomy and automation. 
B. Algorithmic Entities 
Advanced autonomous systems paired with limited liability 
companies that have no individual members, collectively called 
algorithmic entities, could be a sufficient development enabling 
autonomous systems to attain legal personhood for the purposes of 
agency law.52 This legal personhood would not be direct personhood for 
the autonomous system, but indirect personhood for the autonomous 
system through “the opportunity to control an entity that is a legal person 
without potential interference from those preexisting entities that 
established the legal person.”53 
The process by which an algorithmic entity is created utilizes the 
flexibility of state LLC statutes to place the autonomous system in 
control of a separate LLC. Professor Bayern suggests two possible 
methods to create algorithmic entities.54 It is important to note than LLC 
statutes are easily amendable and state legislatures can adjust their 
respective LLC statutes to prevent the creation of algorithmic entities. So 
both of Bayern’s suggested methods, and any other algorithmic entity 
creation methods, are vulnerable to legislative change.55  LLC statutes 
are unique to each state, so the creation of an algorithmic entity will 
depend on the specific state law. For Bayern’s suggestions, he primarily 
analyzes the possible creation methods under the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act.56  
In the first method, an existing person establishes a member-
managed LLC, the person creates an operating agreement governing the 
LLC’s conduct which states that the LLC will act as determined by the 
                                                
 
51 See supra notes 41–49 and the accompanying text. 
52 See Lynn M. Lopucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 890 
(2018) (citing Bayern, supra note 34, at 104–05) (“In two recent articles, 
Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal personhood 
on an autonomous computer program merely by putting it in control of a limited 
liability company (LLC).”). 
53 See Bayern, supra note 34, at 104–05. 
54 See id. at 101–02, 104–05 n.43. 
55 See id. at 104 (“Of course, if legislatures do not like [the possibility of 
algorithmic entities], they can easily amend the LLC acts to prevent it.”). 
56 Id. at 101–03. 
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autonomous system, and the sole member withdraws from the LLC. 57 
The sole member’s withdrawal likely will not cause the LLC to enter 
dissolution, thus creating a perpetual entity managed solely by the 
autonomous system.58 Specifically in New York, the LLC statute 
provides LLC operating agreement drafters with drafting discretion 
regarding how long the entity need not have a member.59 This chosen 
time period could theoretically be such a significant length of time as to 
be practically perpetual.60 
In the second method, an existing person creates two member-
managed LLCs, the person creates identical operating agreements for 
both LLCs which state that the LLC will act as determined by the 
autonomous system, the existing person causes each LLC to be admitted 
as a member of the other entity, and the sole human member withdraws 
from both LLCs.61 This method would create a perpetual algorithmic 
entity—where the first method might not—if the specific state LLC 
statute requires every LLC to have a member or prescribes mandatory 
LLC dissolution procedures upon withdrawal of the final member. 
An algorithmic entity would have the rights, as specified by state 
law, “to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented by 
counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to equal 
protection of the laws, to speak freely, and to spend money on political 
campaigns.”62 Autonomous systems will likely be capable of exercising 
sufficient autonomous judgment to effectively operate algorithmic 
entities in the near future.63  
                                                
 
57 Id. at 101. 
58 See id. at 102 (“[I]t is important to recognize that under many modern LLC 
acts, the sole member's dissociation from the LLC does not require that the LLC 
terminate its existence. Indeed, many acts specifically contemplate at least the 
temporary continuation of a memberless LLC because this is a convenient 
option in several practical cases, such as estate planning.”). 
59 Id. at 103 (citing N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701(a)(4) (1999)). 
60 Id. (“The statute permits, for example, the operating agreement to provide for 
a million year period during which the LLC needn’t have members.”). 
61 Id. at 104, n.43. 
62 Lopucki, supra note 52, at 890–91 (citations omitted). 
63 See id. at 891 (stating that “[m]ost commentators believe that algorithms . . . 
can run profitable businesses,” that commentators have proposed such entities in 
various industries like electronic data storage, bike rental, online gambling, 
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III. AUTONOMOUS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS 
LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PERSONS 
 
Autonomous systems can be persons in two ways: either as a 
direct person that is autonomous or as an indirect person that is formed 
by an algorithmic entity. The distinction between direct and indirect 
personhood depends on whether the rights and obligations of an entity 
are independent from an external reference. An entity is a direct person if 
it does not require an external reference to determine its personhood. The 
concept of independence from an external reference is best explained by 
an example in which an external reference bestows personhood: the 
algorithmic entity. In an algorithmic entity, the personhood of the 
underlying autonomous system is dependent on the existence of the 
separate LLC entity, which is the external reference. In direct 
personhood, the Restatement would recognize the autonomous system 
itself as a person; in indirect personhood, the Restatement would 
recognize the LLC as a person. 
An algorithmic entity’s treatment as a person within agency law 
has not been determined, and, due to its unique characteristics, it can 
arguably be granted or denied personhood based on the traditional 
analysis provided by the Restatement. An algorithmic entity has 
characteristics of a legal person, a purely organizational entity, and a 
mere legally consequential instrumentality. Additionally, when ignoring 
legal form, an autonomous entity is arguably only a computer program 
masquerading as a legal person and thus possibly subject to the 
Restatement commentary’s general skepticism about computer programs 
as agents. 
Ultimately, autonomous systems should be recognized as 
persons in agency law and thus capable of being an agent or principal. 
Autonomous systems should be recognized as direct persons, or, at the 
very least, they should be recognized as indirect persons. Direct 
personhood should be accepted based on the moral recognition that 
personhood is inherently a determination of autonomy. Indirect 
personhood should be accepted based on simple satisfaction of the 
Restatement’s definition of person. Additionally, the pragmatic benefits 
                                                                                                         
 
vending machines, and blockchain-based ventures, and that several start-ups are 
already broaching this field) (citations omitted). 
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resulting from the ability of autonomous systems to act as principals or 
agents support both direct and indirect personhood. 
A. Direct Personhood 
Moral arguments for the strong link between personhood and 
autonomy support the direct recognition of autonomous systems as 
persons. The core requirement of the personhood is the ability to 
“directly” be the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.64 The use of 
the word “directly” in the reporter’s note’s explanation of personhood is 
a curious one. The word “directly” is not used in the definition of 
person65 or in its relevant commentary66 and the word’s most appropriate 
definition is from the source without interruption or diversion by an 
intervenor.67 So, an entity is directly the object of liabilities and the 
holder of rights if there are no intervenors between such entity and the 
associated rights or obligations who are more appropriately subject to 
such rights or obligations than the entity itself. There can be both 
intervenors worthy of being subject to such rights or obligations and 
intervenors unworthy of being subject to such rights or obligations. To 
promote clarity, I have recharacterized this distinction as being a 
                                                
 
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2006) (“For the purposes of the common law of agency, a ‘person’ must be one 
who is directly the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.”). 
65 Id. at § 1.04(5) (“A person is (a) an individual; (b) an organization or 
association that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations; (c) a 
government, political subdivision, or instrumentality or entity created by 
government; or (d) any other entity that has legal capacity to possess rights and 
incur obligations.”). 
66 Id. at § 1.04, cmt. e (“To be capable of acting as a principal or an agent, it is 
necessary to be a person, which in this respect requires capacity to be the holder 
of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”). 
67 Direct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (adverb subsenses b & c), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) 
(defining direct as “from the source without interruption or diversion” and 
“without an intervening agency or step”). The word “directly” is used two other 
times in § 1.04: (1) “directly to” in reporter’s note j; and (2) “direct from” in the 
case citations by jurisdiction. These uses of the word, when paired with a 
preposition, indicate the second subsense of the definition, id. (adverb subsense 
b) (defining direct as “from the source without interruption or diversion”); so the 
use of the word directly without a preposition indicates that the third subsense, 
id. (adverb subsense c) (defining direct as “without an intervening agency or 
step”), is most appropriate. 
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distinction between means—unworthy intervenors—and ends—worthy 
intervenors. 
The analysis of direct personhood turns on determining whether 
the entity is an end, and thus worthy of direct personhood, or a mean to a 
separate end, and thus unworthy of direct personhood. The fact that the 
distinction between means and ends is relevant to direct personhood 
indicates that moral considerations, such as autonomy,68 are critical to 
the characterization of personhood. Autonomous systems are morally 
worthy of recognition as ends because they display sufficient levels of 
autonomy, such a recognition is economically beneficial, and the systems 
can be subject to ethical frameworks to guide their actions. 
Autonomous systems are significantly more autonomous than 
the automated systems that the Restatement commentary has determined 
to be means, and are more worthy for recognition as ends. Autonomous 
systems have progressed substantially in areas that are indicative of 
autonomy, like sophisticated social interactivity,69 which might rise 
above the autonomy threshold for personhood hinted at in the 
Restatement.70 Startups are even currently creating AI, blockchains, and 
augmented reality to develop programs intended to replace basic intimate 
human relationships like romantic partners.71 This level of autonomy 
shown by human social interactivity clearly exceeds the level of dogs 
                                                
 
68 Here, autonomy is used to mean self-direction and independence. See 
Autonomy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (sense 2), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/autonomy (last visited March 9th, 2019) (defining 
autonomy as “self-directing freedom and especially moral independence”). 
69 See Jaden Urbi & MacKenzie Sigalos, The Complicated Truth about Sophia 
the Robot—An Almost Human Robot or a PR Stunt, CNBC (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/05/hanson-robotics-sophia-the-robot-pr-stunt-
artificial-intelligence.html (stating that “a sentient being . . . is the goal of some 
developers” and that there are “a host of players pushing the limits of what 
robots are capable of”); see, e.g., John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: 
Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html.  
70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY at § 1.04 cmt. e; see also supra note 
28 and the accompanying text. 
71 See Shoji Yano, Virtual Girlfriend Rolls AI and Blockchain Tech into One,  
NIKKEI BUS.  REV. (June 6, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Virtual-
girlfriend-rolls-AI-and-blockchain-tech-into-one (describing the startup Cougar 
and its intent to create Virtual Human Agents that can be the customers’ 
girlfriend across all possible digital interfaces). 
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used in the Restatement illustrations.72 In the illustration, the dog is 
trained to and performs the programmed task of retrieving beer from the 
liquor store for his owner while the liquor store owner keeps a running 
tab for the dog owner.73 Because of the structured environment—the path 
to the liquor store and account charging process—and the dog’s limited 
capacity to learn and adapt to unanticipated stimuli, this Restatement’s 
illustration perfectly aligns with the technical definition of an automated 
system as described earlier.74 The dog illustration, as an automated 
system, is clearly distinguishable from an autonomous system. These 
autonomous systems75 rise above what the Restatement commentary 
outlines as mere means unworthy of personhood.76  
The recognition of autonomous systems as ends, and thus direct 
persons, is economically beneficial, which supports such a recognition. 
The economist Paul Streeten’s article on means and ends in the context 
of human development supports the characterization of autonomous 
systems as ends and thus economically worthy of recognition as 
persons.77 Streeten’s analysis touches on fundamental concepts of means-
ends determinations that are applicable in all scenarios.78 He highlights 
two fundamental concepts for the recognition of something as an ends: 
inherency and as a means to higher productivity.79  These two 
fundamental concepts of recognizing ends might not be harmonious in all 
instances, but they are harmonious where there are “rigid links” between 
                                                
 
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY at § 1.04, reporter’s n. e. 
73 Id. 
74 See supra note 38 and the accompanying text. 
75 See supra notes 69–71 and the accompanying text. 
76 See supra notes 36–38 and the accompanying text. 
77 Paul Streeten, Human Development: Means and Ends, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
232 (May 1994). 
78 Cf. id. Streeten emphasizes six reasons that human development and poverty 
eradication should be promoted. The first two are universal and applicable to all 
ends-means determinations, while the final four—human reproductivity, the 
impact on the physical environment, the reduction of poverty, and political 
appeal—are specifically relevant to ends-means determinations for humans. 
Because these final four reasons are not relevant the ends-means determinations 
for autonomous systems, they will not be considered further. 
79 Cf. id. (“First, and above all, it is an end itself, that needs no further 
justification. . . . Second, it is a means to higher productivity.”). 
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economic productivity and the inherent qualities of ends.80 One 
important disharmony exists between the concepts when the inherency 
approach views ends as “active, participating agents” and the means-of-
higher-productivity approach views ends as “targets.”81 For autonomous 
systems, their economic productivity depends on their ability to perform 
in undefined environments with unique, unanticipated stimuli, and their 
level of autonomy inherently justifies characterization as an end. Here, 
inherency and economic productivity both depend on autonomy,  thus, 
their autonomy acts as a “rigid link” that bridges the conceptual 
disharmony noted by Steeten. Both the autonomous system’s inherency 
and means to higher productivity support their recognition as ends.82 
Their autonomy makes them active participating agents,83 andtheir 
autonomy makes them targets worthy of recognition as ends because 
they are economically productive.84 
Moving beyond mere recognition of autonomous systems as 
ends due to the ability to act intentionally and the economic benefits of 
such recognition, the existence of the academic field of machine ethics 
also supports the direct personhood of autonomous systems. There are 
different schools of thought about what can be an artificial moral agent—
i.e., an artificial autonomous actor that possesses moral value and has 
certain rights and responsibilities.85 But the ability to exercise 
autonomous judgment makes such an entity an artificial moral agent 
across all machine ethics conceptual approaches.86 Autonomous systems 
possess such autonomous judgment and thus are ends that possess moral 
                                                
 
80 Cf. id. (“The unity of interests would exist if there were rigid links between 
economic production . . . and human development . . . .”). 
81 Cf. id. at 234. 
82 See supra notes 80–81 and the accompanying text. 
83 Agent is used here in its philosophical context where the word “denote[s] the 
performance of intentional actions.” Markus Schlosser, Agency, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/. 
84 See supra Part III.A. (describing the multitude of current productive 
technological uses of autonomous systems). 
85 See Robert James M. Boyles, Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral 
Agent Frameworks, 6 SURI 92, 92–100 (2018) (defining briefly artificial moral 
agents and then discussing the key concepts of three different conceptual 
approaches to determining what constitutes an artificial moral agent), 
https://philpapers.org/archive/BOYPSF.pdf.  
86 See id. 
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value and have certain rights and responsibilities. The application of 
ethical requirements to something recognizes that it is an end and not a 
mere means. Requirements that one act ethically and fulfill ethical 
obligations are also similar to the ability to hold legal rights and 
obligations—the core of personhood in agency law. 
The field of machine ethics is “concerned with adding an ethical 
dimension to machines” by “ensuring that the behavior of machines 
towards human users and . . . other machines . . . is ethically 
acceptable.”87 The stated ultimate goal of machine ethics “is to create a 
machine that itself follows an ideal ethical principle or set of 
principles.”88 The study of machine ethics is necessary for the 
development of AI—which is an important development for autonomous 
systems—and the imposition of ethical standards on AI is likely 
necessary for widespread public acceptance of such technology.89 
For the machine to be an ideal agent it must be an explicit ethical 
agent that is “able to calculate the best action in ethical dilemmas using 
ethical principles,” as opposed to an implicit ethical agent that is simply 
programmed to behave ethically. 90 This level of judgment that could be 
present in autonomous systems moves far beyond that contemplated by 
the Restatement commentary when expressing skepticism about 
computer programs or dogs as principals and agents, and supports the 
direct personhood of autonomous systems. The Restatement commentary 
practically attributes all computer program error to the user and imposes 
no blame on the computer program itself.91 In the illustration where the 
dog retrieves alcohol upon the instruction of its owner, the commentary 
contemplates no ethical blameworthiness for the dog when it acts without 
                                                
 
87 Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson, Machine Ethics: Creating an 
Ethical Intelligent Agent, 28 AI MAG. 15, 15 (Winter 2007). 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 16 (“[I]t could be argued that humans’ fear of the possibility of 
autonomous intelligent machines stems from their concern about whether these 
machines will behave ethically, so the future of AI may be at stake. Whether 
society allows AI researchers to develop anything like autonomous intelligent 
machines may hinge on whether they are able to build in safeguards against 
unethical behavior.”). 
90 Id. at 15 (citing James H. Moor, The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of 
Machine Ethics, 21 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 18 (July/Aug. 2006)). 
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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the owner’s direction.92 While under machine ethics, the autonomous 
program itself would bear ethical blame for any such wrongdoing in both 
scenarios.93  
Machines will likely be more ethical beings than humans, 
making them more worthy of treatment as ends and direct persons than 
humans, which are clearly accepted as ends capable of direct 
personhood. Machines will not be subject to the “genetic predisposition 
toward unethical behavior as a survival mechanism.”94 This unethical 
genetic predisposition is present in human beings due to the evolutionary 
promotion of the human instinct to survive at all costs.95 Any concern 
that machines can start out behaving ethically and end up behaving 
unethically stems more from concerns about human behavior than about 
the possible ethical corruption of autonomous systems and AI.96 
This recommended recognition of legal status in non-human 
entities similar to that of humans—which inherently blurs the lines 
between what is and what is not morally worthy of legal recognition—is 
not novel just to agency law.97 The progress of technology towards “truly 
artificial intelligences, with cognition and consciousness recognizably 
similar to our own”98 and the creation of genetic chimeras—which 
involves the splicing of different genetic materials to create new 
biological creatures99—are also pressing once-clear distinctions between 
                                                
 
92 See id. 
93 See supra notes 88–90 and the accompanying text. 
94 Anderson & Anderson, supra note 87, at 17 (citing Eric Dietrich, “After the 
Humans Are Gone,” Keynote address presented at the 2006 North American 
Computing and Philosophy Conference, RPI, Troy, NY (Aug. 12, 2006)). 
95 Id. 
96 See id. (“Most human beings are far from ideal models of ethical agents, 
despite having been taught ethical principles; and humans do, in particular, tend 
to favor themselves. Machines, though, might have an advantage over human 
beings in terms of behaving ethically.”). 
97 See James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator? The Future of Constitutional 
Personhood, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 9, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/0309_personhood_boyle.pdf. 
98 Id. at 5 (quoting Rodney Brooks, I, Rodney Brooks, Am a Robot, 45 IEEE 
SPECTRUM 71 (June 2008)). 
99 Id. (providing examples of chimeras like bioluminescent tomato plants from 
splicing fish and tomato DNA and onco-mice used in cancer research that are 
the result of splicing mouse and human DNA). 
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the human and non-human.100 Much like “constitutional law will have to 
classify artificially created entities that have some but not all of the 
attributes we associate with human beings,” agency law will have similar 
classification conundrums.101  The previously discussed focus on 
determining direct personhood based on moral qualification as an end, 
instead of the sole focus on rights and obligations, is one normative 
theoretical approach to solving these conundrums. For direct personhood, 
agency law should recognize the existence of autonomous judgment as 
sufficient for personhood. 
B. Indirect Personhood 
Because indirect personhood is determined by reference to the 
LLC organization of an algorithmic entity, the analysis of an autonomous 
system’s personhood in this context is straightforward. The LLC is a 
well-known and traditional legal entity and only a traditional analysis 
need be applied. This analysis focuses on the distinctions between legally 
recognized persons, mere legally consequential instrumentalities, and 
purely organizational entities.  
Characterization of an autonomous system as a computer 
program that is a mere legally consequential instrumentality poses a risk 
to the personhood of algorithmic entities. If an algorithmic entity is truly 
autonomous and no individuals are associated with the LLC, then an 
algorithmic entity is clearly distinguishable from automated computer 
systems, specifically referred to as electronic agents, discussed in the 
Restatement’s reporter’s note.102  The fact that an autonomous system 
directs the actions of the LLC displays volition not previously 
contemplated by computer programs.103 The presence of the LLC entity 
also removes any concern about the lack of a person who can be subject 
                                                
 
100 Id. 
101 Cf. id. at 6 (discussing the difficulty of classifying artificial entities in 
constitutional law). 
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2006). See also supra notes 35–40 and the accompanying text (differentiating 
autonomous systems from automated systems). 
103 Compare Lopucki, supra note 52, at 899 (“[A]n entity controlled by an 
algorithm might be virtually indistinguishable from one controlled by 
humans.”), with Sommer, supra note 31, at 1179 (“[The electronic agent] simply 
responds to its internal programming and external parameters. Beyond its 
programming and parameters, it cannot keep its user informed of transactions it 
is processing, or problems that might be developing.”). 
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to legal rights and obligations.104  The autonomy level of the autonomous 
system will be a key factor in recognizing personhood even if the LLC’s 
legal form is ignored—much like autonomy favors recognition of direct 
personhood for the autonomous system.  
The limitation of purely organizational entities not being persons 
has traditionally only excluded trusts or estates,105 so the LLC as a 
separate legal entity capable of possessing its own rights and obligations 
likely precludes characterizing the algorithmic entity as a purely 
organizational entity. There is a possible argument that the purpose of the 
exclusion of purely organizational entities, like trusts and estates, is to 
look past legal form and only recognize volitional actors, like trustees 
and estate administrators, as persons. But the Restatement commentary 
for purely organizational entities focuses primarily on direct capability of 
having rights and obligations and not on volition.106 
Ultimately, because the guiding principle of personhood 
categorization is legal capacity107 and algorithmic entities have sufficient 
legal rights,108 traditional Restatement analysis likely grants autonomous 
algorithmic entities personhood as an entity that has legal capacity to 
possess rights and incur obligations.109 Because the legal capacity of non-
individual agents and principals is determined by the law creating such 
non-individual,110 state LLC statutes will determine the algorithmic 
entity’s personhood. Such state LLC statutes enable the algorithmic 
                                                
 
104 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (quoting 
Sommer, supra note 31). 
105 Id. (“[T]he definition [of person] in black letter of this Restatement does not 
include ‘any form of trust or estate.’”). 
106 See id. (“For the purposes of the common law of agency, a ‘person’ must be 
one who is directly the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.”). 
107 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
108 See Lopucki, supra note 52, at 890–91 (stating that algorithmic entities 
would have the right “to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented 
by counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to equal protection 
of the laws, to speak freely, and to spend money on political campaigns”). 
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e. (“To be capable of acting 
as a principal or an agent, it is necessary to be a person, which in this respect 
requires capacity to be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”). 
110 See id. at § 3.04(2), § 3.05 cmt. b. 
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entity to act like any other LLC or corporation capable of being an agent 
or principal.111 
 
C. A Pragmatic Example 
 Policy arguments support both the moral-based justification for 
the recognition of direct personhood and the doctrine-based justification 
for the recognition of indirect personhood in autonomous systems. 
Recognizing autonomous systems as persons capable of being agents or 
principals can create immediate tangible benefits from AI improving 
present-day society. One such example in the field of corporate 
governance is autonomous systems revolutionizing the corporate 
decision-making process. 
Business is becoming increasingly complex, and autonomous 
systems and their utilization of AI can augment, or even replace, the 
human board of directors’ fallible judgments in this complex 
environment. Artificial intelligence can be a characteristic of an 
autonomous system.112 This improved corporate decision-making is one 
pragmatic example that supports the need for agency law’s recognition of 
personhood for autonomous systems. Commenters have also noted this 
growing business complexity and suggested that the most appropriate 
response to the complexity “will be to incorporate AI in the practice of 
corporate governance and strategy.”113 Companies are already 
                                                
 
111 Bayern, supra note 34, at 104 (“The end result is novel legal personhood—or 
at least a functional analogue of it—without any ongoing commitment by, or 
subservience to, a preexisting person.”). 
112 Shani R. Else & Francis G. X. Pileggi, Corporate Directors Must Consider 
Impact of Artificial Intelligence for Effective Corporate Governance, BUS. LAW 
TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019), https:// businesslawtoday.org/2019/02/corporate-
directors-must-consider-impact-artificial-intelligence-effective-corporate-
governance/ (defining AI generally as “the capacity of a computer or electronic 
device to use characteristics associated with human intelligence, including 
reasoning and learning from prior experiences”). 
113 Barry Libert, Megan Beck & Mark Bonchek, AI in the Boardroom, MIT 
SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/ai-in-
the-boardroom-the-next-realm-of-corporate-governance (“The truth is that 
business has become too complex and is moving too rapidly for boards and 
CEOs to make good decisions without intelligent systems. We believe that the 
solution to this complexity will be to incorporate AI in the practice of corporate 
governance and strategy.”). 
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implementing this suggestion.114  One Hong Kong venture capital firm 
even integrated AI so deeply into its decision-making that the firm 
“would not make positive investment decisions without corroboration by 
[the AI system].”115 AI can augment or replace both strategic—typically 
associated with board and C-suite decisions—and operational decision-
making—typically associated with C-suite or lower management 
decisions.116 The company’s success might even be wholly dependent on 
such AI input.117 Overall, this improved decision-making will benefit 
companies, shareholders, and society. 
The commenters’ predictions about the impact level of the AI 
underlying autonomous systems on corporate governance vary. Some 
commenters limit the impact to simply “augmenting board intelligence 
using AI” but not “automating leadership and governance.”118 These 
augmentations would occur for strategic decisions—e.g., tracking capital 
allocation, highlighting company performance relative to industry trends, 
reviewing competitor press releases to identify potential new 
competitors, etc.—and operational decisions—e.g., analyzing internal 
communications to assess employee morale, predicting employee 
turnover, or identifying subtle changes in customer preferences or 
demographics.119 Other commenters predict that the autonomous systems 
will assume a significant amount of management activity by noting that 
“most duties in typical corporations will be automated within five to ten 
years,” but they do not suggest that AI will fully assume all management 
                                                
 
114 See Nicky Burridge, Artificial Intelligence Gets a Seat in the Boardroom, 
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 10, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Artificial-
intelligence-gets-a-seat-in-the-boardroom (describing a data scientist’s comment 
that “AI is increasingly being used to support management decisions across 
many sectors” and noting that many hedge funds and investment funds have 
already started to use AI as a decision-making tool for risk analysis without 
public announcement). 
115 Id. (quoting the venture capital firm’s managing partner, Dmitry Kaminskiy). 
116 See Libert, Beck & Bonchek, supra note 113 (“Artificial intelligence for both 
strategic decision-making (capital allocation) and operating decision-making 
will come to be an essential competitive advantage . . . .”). 
117 See Burridge, supra note 114 (stating that the managing partner of a venture 
capital firm believed “that the fund would have gone under without [the AI 
system] because it would have invested in ‘overhyped projects’” and that the AI 
“helped the board to make more logical decisions”). 
118 Libert, Beck & Bonchek, supra note 113. 
119 See id. 
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actions.120 The same commenter even noted that decentralized 
autonomous companies—companies able to operate without human 
involvement—will exist in the near future. 121  
One legal scholar has even gone so far as to suggest that AI 
could assume all corporate management responsibilities, consequently 
removing the need for human management.122 If such AI management 
materializes, the scholar suggests that corporate governance might react 
by moving from a multi-person collective board with a two-tier corporate 
board and officer management model to a single “fused” management 
model operated solely by the AI.123 The scholar further justifies this 
management model shift by stating that the performance of the AI “will 
be superior to today’s human-led governance.”124 The scholar argues 
“that it is not an insurmountable step from AI generating and suggesting 
expert decisions for managers (which in some areas is already common 
today) to AI making these decisions autonomously.”125 The scholar 
predicts that this fused management software will be offered either for 
sale or hire by large commercial AI software providers.126 This full 
assumption approach is not near practical implementation; even the 
aforementioned venture capital firm that conditioned its investment 
decisions on AI approval only treated the AI as “a member of [its] board 
with observer status” and not as a full board member.127 
Despite the clear beneficial role that autonomous systems can 
have in corporate decision making as separate consultants or direct 
decision-makers, their ability to fulfill this beneficial role will be limited 
unless both agency law and corporate law recognize autonomous systems 
                                                
 
120 Burridge, supra note 114 (stating that the interview subject, the managing 
partner of a venture capital firm, believes that “corporate winners” will augment 
human decisions by combining “smart machines with smart people” but will not 
“fully replace people on boards of directors”). 
121 See id. (providing an example of such a decentralized autonomous 
company—a municipal-run taxi company that operates self-driving cars and 
directs the car routes and maintenance via a computer algorithm). 
122 Martin Petrin, Corporate Management in the Age of AI (Univ. Coll. London, 
Working Paper No. 3, 2019) (forthcoming in COLUM. BUS. L. REV.), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346722. 
123 See id. at 4, 52–53. 
124 Id. at 4. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See Burridge, supra note 114. 
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as capable decision-makers. Without agency law recognition, the 
autonomous system-agent could not directly bind the corporation-
principal by the autonomous system’s decision. Without corporate law 
recognition, the autonomous system is not duly authorized to serve the 
corporation as a director-agent. One corporate law hurdle is the 
requirement that directors be natural persons—i.e. human individuals.128 
Similar natural person director limitations exist in other foreign 
jurisdictions.129  Another corporate law hurdle is the prohibition on 
directors delegating decision making duties to non-directors.130 The 
corporate law hurdles can, and should, be overcome by recognizing that 
autonomous systems are capable of being directors or advisors whom 
directors can consult. The agency law hurdle can, and should, be 
overcome by directly or indirectly recognizing the personhood of the 
autonomous systems. Overall, granting legal recognition of AI as board 
members or consultants, which allows AI to directly affect corporate 
decision making, is a significant global issue.131 Society can directly and 
immediately benefit if agency law recognizes the personhood of 
autonomous systems that use AI. 
 
                                                
 
128 See Else & Pileggi, supra note 112 (“It is important to note, however, that in 
Delaware board members must be ‘natural persons,’ so ‘appointing an AI 
program’ as a board member for a Delaware corporation would be 
impermissible.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2016)).  
129 See, e.g., Teresa Kauppila, Is There Room on Your Board for AI?, LEXOLOGY 
(Nov. 1, 2018), https:// www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d7339c3a-
c75a-45cc-be6e-92b24be924f8 (“There is one significant limitation to the use of 
AI in boards of directors: in Finland, AI applications cannot be appointed as full 
board members. The Limited Liability Companies Act does not explicitly state 
the board members must be natural persons, but that is only because this has 
been taken for granted. This issue has previously been discussed in connection 
with whether a legal person could service as a board member, as is the case in 
some countries.”). 
130 See Else & Pileggi, supra note 112 (discussing the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s decision in Canal Capital Corp. v. French, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, *5 
and stating that, “[t]o the extent a board moves forward to adopt AI, it is crucial 
that the board does not delegate its essential management functions and rely 
solely upon AI in making decisions for the corporation. Doing so would be a 
prohibited delegation of its duties”). 
131 See Kauppila, supra note 129 (“Today, the global discussion has moved on to 
whether an AI could be a full board member and what kinds of legal challenges 
such membership would entail.”). 





The Restatement (Third) of Agency’s definition of personhood is 
ripe for reconsideration, and the internal tensions of the definition are an 
underexplored area of legal scholarship—despite what appears to be 
extensive discussion of AI agency in philosophy. The emergence of AI 
computing, and the associated development of truly autonomous 
computer systems, will test traditional agency law with questions like 
who or what can be a person. These autonomous systems can be persons 
in two ways: either as a direct person that is independent or as an indirect 
person that is formed by an algorithmic entity. The recognition of 
personhood for autonomous systems should be direct and based on the 
acceptance that personhood depends on the moral recognition of 
autonomy; but, at the very least, recognition of personhood should be 
indirect as algorithmic entities under the traditional doctrine. 
The recognition of the direct personhood of autonomous systems 
requires a fundamental shift in the Restatement’s definition of 
personhood. The shift would be from the sole focus on rights and 
obligations to a more holistic determination that autonomous judgment 
should determine the ability to be a principal and agent.  This normative 
theoretical shift within the definition is appropriate as the internal 
tensions of the traditional analysis are heightened with the rapid 
development of new technology. Fortunately, this fundamental shift will 
not require the common law to write on a blank slate; the philosophical 
analysis of agency can guide the law here. 
Indirect personhood for autonomous systems occurs by attaching 
them to previously recognized legal entities that fit into the traditional 
definitional analysis. In traditional doctrine, the Restatement’s definition 
of person attempts to distinguish legally recognized persons from purely 
organizational entities and mere instrumentalities. At present, the 
Restatement views computer programs as mere instrumentalities of the 
using person and thus not a separate person capable of being a principal 
or agent. The traditional doctrine also focuses almost exclusively on the 
ability to be the object of liabilities and the holder of rights. Thus, the 
presence of the recognized legal entity will allow the autonomous 
systems to attain indirect personhood. But the reliance of indirect 
personhood on organizational law that is easily amendable by the 
legislature necessitates analysis of direct personhood for autonomous 
systems.  
331          AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AS LEGAL AGENTS  [Vol. 18 




Ultimately, autonomous systems should be recognized as legal 
persons for the purposes of agency law. This acceptance has the potential 
for significant knock-on pragmatic benefits, with one such example 
being improved corporate decision-making.  
There are several downstream implications that are ripe for 
future research if autonomous systems are directly or indirectly 
recognized as persons. The most critical determination will be deciding 
what level of autonomous judgment is enough for personhood. While 
this Note clearly accepts that autonomous systems, as defined in Part I, 
are on the right side of the line of autonomous judgment, the line must be 
drawn somewhere. For computer-related systems, the appropriate line 
might be between autonomous and automated systems.132 Overall, this 
line-drawing will “highlight how difficult it is to identify machine 
consciousness or personhood [and] how uncertain we are about the 
boundaries of our own [consciousness and personhood].”133 Other areas 
of study include reacting to the inherent risks posed by recognizing the 
direct personhood of non-humans or so easily allowing the satisfaction of 
personhood by indirect personhood.  
 
                                                
 
132 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
133 Boyle, supra note 97, at 18. 
